Code Voting for Swiss Internet Voting

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1 Introduction

Switzerland is attempting to introduce an internet voting channel, with serious efforts starting as early as 2001 [7]. However, a clear solution has not yet been established: Switzerland has seen multiple systems come and go [8,5,13], along with three major revisions of its applicable law [9].

As Switzerland attempts to re-introduce internet voting, Swiss Post has the only viable system in reach. It is based on a system once distributed by Scytl [21]. While it was gradually extended over time, the core mechanisms remained the same [1,12,25]. As did the feedback: Critics regret low implementation quality [19,17,18] and very complex proofs and specification [20,28,10].

We believe the complexity of the protocol is indeed a serious issue that reduces implementation quality, makes reviews hard, and ultimately also undermines full trust in the system. But redesigning the protocol based on the same assumptions and same mechanisms will likely not result in a much simpler protocol; this has been attempted by experienced researchers in 2017 in the form of CHVote [14,3], which also turned out to be complex.

2 Code Voting

We propose tackling the complexity using code voting [11,23,4]. In code voting, each voting option is associated with a voting code. For each voter, these voting codes are then randomly permuted into voter-specific voting codes. To cast a vote, the voter submits the appropriate voting code.

If the voting server and network are untrusted, as it is the case in the Swiss setting, submitted voting codes are attributable to individual voters. To remedy this issue, code voting may be used with a privacy-preserving tally mechanism (e.g. verified shuffle), by mapping cast voting codes to ciphertext representing the voting choice. The same authority already responsible for generating the voter-specific permutation of the voting codes can generate the appropriate lookup.

With code voting, the voter’s device needs not be trusted for privacy, as the voting option is already entered in an encrypted form. Additionally, code voting promises to reach a notion of everlasting privacy, as, by the voter-specific permutation, the voter-specific voting codes are a perfect encryption of the voting options.

Code voting also allows using simpler and fewer cryptographic operations. If voter-specific encryption keys are generated by multiple authorities, the voter-specific permutations are applied one after the other. If the vote is sent over an
insecure network, the voter’s device no longer needs to encrypt, but can simply forward the voting code. Consequentially, the voter no longer needs to enter a security-level appropriate encryption key, the expectedly much shorter voting codes suffice. The validation of the vote is trivial, as valid voting codes are public information. To implement return codes, a voter-specific lookup, mapping each voting code to the appropriate return code, is sufficient.

For the voter, the process of casting a vote changes: Instead of entering the voting option, they now have to enter the corresponding voting code. It is our understanding, strengthened by corresponding communications with the Swiss chancellery, that the current Swiss law does not forbid code voting. An extension of the Swiss Post Protocol incorporating code voting has been shown to not reduce general usability [29].

3 Proofs

The proposed code voting scheme needs to be proven secure. Swiss law [9] mandates computational and symbolic proofs of four high-level properties, that we decompose into provable formal definitions while respecting Swiss particularities (for example, the availability of multiple voting channels).

Individual verifiability is defined to hold by Swiss law when voters are given exactly one of two proofs: Voters who participate electronically are given a proof that the vote has been registered successfully by the server, exactly as cast. Voters who did not participate electronically can request a proof that their vote has not been registered by the server [6, article 5.2, appendix 2.5]. The literature usually only refers to the first proof as individual verifiability (see [24,15,3]). We cover the second proof with an additional property we call Participation Verifiability; a new term, as we are not aware of this property being used in the literature. We guarantee the "registered successfully" part by proving Vote Verifiability that ensures all votes represent valid voting options.

Universal Verifiability is defined to hold when the auditors are given a proof that the result is composed out of all, and only out of, successfully registered votes [6, article 5.3, appendix 2.6]. This property is consistent with its use in literature (see [24,15,3]), although Swiss law only requires it to hold for auditors.

Vote Secrecy is defined to hold if the plaintext vote cannot be attributed to the voter, and Fairness ensures the attacker does not learn partial election results before the official tally [6, article 7, appendix 2.7]. While this intuition matches the literature, established privacy definitions such as BPRIV or Benaloh do not apply to return-code based schemes [2,28]. Further, we are not aware of any formal definition or proof of fairness; although depending on how both properties are formally defined, privacy might imply fairness.

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1 The voting codes need only be long enough to represent all voting choices.
2 The property remains unproven for CHVote [3] and the Swiss Post protocol [22].
3 The property was however discussed as part of Selections [27].
4 This property is also referred to as ballot verifiability [3] or vote compliance [22].
Authentication is defined to hold when the attacker cannot insert votes without controlling the voter [6, appendix 2.8]. In the literature, this property is usually referred to as Eligibility Verification (see [16,26,15,3]). Implicitly, the law also requires that voters must only cast and confirm a single vote, which we refer to as Eligibility Uniqueness, as in the verifiability analysis of CHVote [3].

We introduce the formal definitions free from potentially complex protocol-specific syntax. This enables fruitful discussions over whether the definitions indeed capture the security notions implied by the Swiss law, while not limiting the discussions to experts of the concrete protocol. Further, we aim for as consistent definitions as possible. This makes it easier to think about whether all necessary properties have been captured; and it allows to simplify the proofs (e.g. by reusing game hops of similar properties). As another way to simplify the proofs, we aim to encapsulate the privacy-preserving tally mechanism and prove it separately.

4 References


